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Abstract
Background: As Arab countries seek to implement the ‘Guideline on Good Pharmacovigilance Practice (GVP) for
Arab countries’, understanding policy implementation mechanisms and the factors impacting it can inform best
implementation practice. This study aimed to explore the mechanisms of and factors influencing
pharmacovigilance policy implementation in Arab countries with more established pharmacovigilance systems
(Jordan, Oman), to inform policy implementation in a country with a nascent pharmacovigilance system (Kuwait).
Results: Matland’s ambiguity-conflict model served to frame data analysis from 56 face-to-face interviews, which
showed that policy ambiguity and conflict were low in Jordan and Oman, suggesting an “administrative
implementation” pathway. In Kuwait, policy ambiguity was high while sentiments about policy conflict were varied,
suggesting a mixture between “experimental implementation” and “symbolic implementation”. Factors reducing
policy ambiguity in Jordan and Oman included: decision-makers’ guidance to implementors, stakeholder
involvement in the policy’s development and implementation, training of policy implementors throughout the
implementation process, clearly outlined policy goals and means, and presence of a strategic implementation plan
with appropriate timelines as well as a monitoring mechanism. In contrast, policy ambiguity in Kuwait stemmed
from the absence or lack of attention to these factors. Factors reducing policy conflict included: the policy’s
compliance with internationally recognised standards and the policy’s fit with local capabilities (all three countries),
decision-makers’ cooperation with and support of the national centre as well as stakeholders’ agreement on policy
goals and means (Jordan and Oman) and adopting a stepwise approach to implementation (Jordan).
Conclusions: Using Matland’s model, both the mechanism of and factors impacting successful pharmacovigilance
policy implementation were identified. This informed recommendations for best implementation practice in Arab as
well as other countries with nascent pharmacovigilance systems, including increased managerial engagement and
support, greater stakeholder involvement in policy development and implementation, and undertaking more
detailed implementation planning.
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Background
Since the thalidomide tragedy in the 1960s, adverse drug
reactions (ADRs) have garnered increased attention
internationally, accompanied by a worrying upward
trend in ADRs resulting from prescribed drugs. [1] Of
particular relevance are ADRs which are unexpected or
severe, leading to increased morbidity, mortality and
financial loss, yet are often not recognised or identified
before regulatory approval due to the limitations of
clinical trials. [2, 3] The steady increase in medicine
use worldwide is likely to increase the incidence of
ADRs [1, 3].
To preserve public health and maintain confidence in
the healthcare system, national governments implement
policies in the form of a pharmacovigilance system to
ensure the quality, safety, and effectiveness of approved
drugs [4] according to the World Health Organization’s
(WHO) guidelines [5–7]. Pharmacovigilance systems in-
clude mechanisms to monitor and evaluate drug safety
throughout a medicine’s entire lifecycle. The system
serves to collect and analyse reports of drug-related
problems including ADRs by employing measures of
quality control and assurance as well as disseminating
information on potential risks to healthcare professionals
and the public. [3]
At present, most of the world’s drug safety data origin-
ate from the developed world. [8, 9] However, differ-
ences in local factors including drugs’ effects on patients,
prescribing patterns, regulation methods, quality, and
availability mean that data used in assessing ADRs may
have limited validity or relevance for patients living out-
side these countries. [10, 11] Hence, countries outside
the developed world must implement policies aimed at
building national pharmacovigilance systems. [12]
Globally, there is great disparity among countries in
pharmacovigilance systems development and implemen-
tation. [13–15] Most developed countries have well-
established systems, whereas many developing countries
still lack fully functioning systems. [16, 17] The
challenges many developing countries face are ADR
under-reporting, human resource shortages, inadequate
financial resources, as well as poor policy and legal
framework. [9, 10, 17, 18]
The Arab World is experiencing significant activity
with regards to pharmacovigilance. [19] However, like
other developing countries, Arab countries differ signifi-
cantly in their pharmacovigilance systems’ development
level, ranging from those having either weak or non-
existent systems (e.g. Kuwait, Djibouti, Lebanon,
Palestine, and Qatar), to others having systems compar-
able to those in developed countries (e.g. Morocco,
Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia). [11, 20–22] To har-
monise pharmacovigilance practices in the Arab World,
the Arab League developed the ‘Guideline on Good
Pharmacovigilance Practices (GVP) for Arab Countries’,
which is based on the European GVP guideline and was
due for implementation by July 2015. [23]
As Arab countries seek to implement the Arab GVP
guideline; and given pharmacovigilance’s importance as
part of a country’s public health policies’ portfolio, un-
derstanding the mechanism(s) of policy implementation
and the factors influencing it can inform best practice in
nascent systems in the region. International experience
has demonstrated that adopted policies are not always
implemented as expected and do not necessarily achieve
their intended results. [24, 25] Moreover, policymakers
frequently focus on outputs or outcomes while ignoring
the implementation process which could reveal the bar-
riers to effective implementation. [26] Therefore, learn-
ing about the implementation process can assist in
gaining a better understanding of the factors impacting
policies’ success or failure. [27]
This paper aims to compare the mechanisms and fac-
tors influencing pharmacovigilance policy implementa-
tion in Arab countries with established systems to
inform pharmacovigilance policy implementation in a
country with a nascent system.
Methods
Theoretical framework
‘Policy implementation’ is defined as “the mechanisms,
resources, and relationships that link policies to
programme action” ([26], p. 37). This study adopted
Matland’s [28] “ambiguity-conflict model” of policy im-
plementation as a theoretical framework that synthesises
many of the key insights from previous research on pol-
icy implementation. [29, 30] The model has been widely
used in policy implementation analysis, the description
and analysis of the relationships between policy and
practice, implementation success or failure, and has pro-
duced valuable insights regarding policy implementation.
[31] The model considers the extent of conflict associ-
ated with a policy and the level of ambiguity in policy
development and implementation as the key factors
shaping the implementation process. The extent of pol-
icy ambiguity and conflict are used to explain how
different approaches to policy implementation occur.
Matland [28] characterises policy conflict as the situ-
ation where “more than one organisation sees a policy as
directly relevant to its interests and when the organisa-
tions have incongruous views” ([28], p. 156 ). Policy con-
flict increases the difficulty of successful policy
implementation. Policy actors’ perceptions of ambiguity
in goals and means increase the impact of contextual
factors. The framework combines these two dimensions
into a four-cell matrix (illustrated in Table 1), with each
cell representing a distinct approach to implementation
with a central principle determining its outcomes.
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Despite the model’s presentation of ambiguity and con-
flict as dichotomous, Matland [28] stresses that the the-
oretical constructs are continuous, and that there is no
tipping point causing radical shifts from one implemen-
tation type to another.
Study design
This was a qualitative, semi-structured interview study
of policy implementors from the national pharmacovigi-
lance centres and the pharmaceutical industry in three
Arab countries. The current situation of pharmacovigi-
lance policy implementation in Jordan, Oman, and
Kuwait highlights the differences in the level of pharma-
covigilance systems’ development. Although the three
countries have all adopted the GVP for Arab countries
as part of their national pharmacovigilance policies, they
differ in several aspects that are summarised in Table 2.
For example, despite all three countries’ national drug
authorities being responsible for carrying out
pharmacovigilance-related activities, Kuwait is the only
country in which these activities are not being carried
out within an independent department. Moreover, only
in Jordan is the policy applied in the form of a law.
Kuwait is one of the Arab countries without an offi-
cially recognised pharmacovigilance system [11, 20, 22],
and whose performance lags behind many other Arab
countries’ systems [20]. Therefore, it represents a coun-
try with a nascent pharmacovigilance system. Jordan and
Oman were selected as two countries at more advanced
levels of performance and implementation of the GVP
for Arab countries. [11, 20] Jordan possessed a pharma-
covigilance system which is among the highest perform-
ing systems in the region. [20] Oman’s
pharmacovigilance system’s performance level falls in
the middle between Kuwait and Jordan [20] and
highlights the progression of pharmacovigilance policy
implementation among Arab countries with pharmacov-
igilance systems at different levels of performance.
Sampling and recruitment
Approval was sought from the three national drug au-
thorities (Jordan Food and Drug Administration (JFDA),
Oman’s Directorate General of Pharmaceutical Affairs
and Drug Control (DGPA&DC) and Kuwait Drug and
Food Control Administration (KDFCA)), as well as
members of the pharmaceutical industry. University eth-
ics approval was obtained. Eligible participants included
individuals who were current or immediate past em-
ployees of the national drug authority with direct in-
volvement in implementing the pharmacovigilance
policy and individuals employed in a pharmaceutical
company operating in the study country as the desig-
nated person responsible for pharmacovigilance. Sam-
pling was purposive and employed snowballing. All
potential participants were emailed a study information
sheet by a gatekeeper at the national drug authority and
asked to contact the researcher to participate.
Taking into consideration the type and diversity of the
target study population, it was deemed sufficient to
interview 12 to 20 individuals per country to achieve
data saturation. [33, 34]
Data collection
Following written consent, the primary author con-
ducted, and audio recorded face-to-face interviews (in
English) lasting 60 min on average. Extensive field notes
were taken, and participants also completed a question-
naire capturing characteristics such as gender, educa-
tional background, and employment sector. Interviews
were conducted sequentially from April through
Table 1 Ambiguity-Conflict matrix: Policy implementation processes ([28, 32] p. 230)
Low Conflict High Conflict
Low
Ambiguity
Administrative Implementation Political Implementation
• Goals are given and a means for problem-solving is known
• A central authority has the information, resources, and sanction capability to
enact the desired policy
• Implementation is hierarchically ordered with each link receiving orders from
the level above
• The policy is spelt out explicitly at each level and there is agreement on
responsibilities and tasks
• Relatively uniform outcomes at the micro-level across many sites
• There is conflict over both goals and means
• The implementation process is a key arena for
conflict
• Implementation outcomes are determined by the
distribution of power
• Compliance is not automatically forthcoming
• Low ambiguity ensures that monitoring of
compliance is relatively easy
High
Ambiguity
Experimental Implementation Symbolic Implementation
• Outcomes depend largely on which actors are involved
• Variation in outcomes from site to site
• Outcomes are hard to predict
• Opportunities for local entrepreneurs to create local policies
• Compliance monitoring mechanisms are of limited relevance
• The policy may become a low priority
• Ostensibly implausible combination
• Salient symbols can produce high levels of conflict
even when the policy is vague
• Outcomes will vary across sites
• Outcomes will depend upon the balance of local
coalition strength
• Policy ambiguity makes it difficult to monitor
activities
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December 2019, starting in Jordan, followed by Oman,
and finally Kuwait [20]. This sequential approach en-
abled the use of the insights gained from earlier in later
interviews, and particularly to sense check potential rec-
ommendations in the least developed country with
regards to their pharmacovigilance systems.
The interview topic guide was informed by Matland’s
[28] ambiguity-conflict model and existing literature on
policy implementation research [35–37]. To establish
the type of policy implementation process followed in
the study countries, the interviews focused on exploring
the levels of and factors impacting policy ambiguity and
conflict during the policy implementation process. This
was achieved by identifying the facilitators and barriers
to policy implementation, as well as participants’ percep-
tions regarding ambiguity and conflict through enquiring
about their understanding and acceptance of its goals
and means. The main questions covered in interviews
are listed in Table 3.
Data analysis
Verbatim interview transcripts and field notes were
managed using NVivo 12 and subjected to thematic
framework analysis involving five steps: familiarisation,
coding, thematic framework identification, charting data
into a matrix, and data interpretation. [38] The analysis
employed both an inductive and deductive approach to
develop themes that provided rich and detailed
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descriptions of the dataset whilst mapping onto Mat-
land’s [28] ambiguity-conflict model. Connections within
the themes were made and key similarities and differ-
ences between countries as well as between participants
from the two sectors were identified.
Results
Fifty-six participants were interviewed (17 participants in
Jordan, 16 in Oman, and 23 in Kuwait). All but two in-
terviews were audio-recorded where only detailed notes
were taken. All members of the national pharmacovigi-
lance centres in the three countries (n = 5 per country)
participated in the study along with an additional two
members of the regional pharmacovigilance centres in
Jordan. Most participants were pharmacists (n = 48) and
mainly employed by the pharmaceutical industry
(n = 38).
The findings of the study are presented in the form of
a comparison between the three countries divided into
two parts. The first part covers the two dimensions of
Matland’s [28] model, namely the levels of ambiguity
and conflict associated with the pharmacovigilance pol-
icy present in Jordan, Oman, and Kuwait. The second
part covers the factors that impacted both policy ambi-
guity and conflict. To illustrate the extent of each
country’s participants’ agreement surrounding these is-
sues, the terms few (n ≤ 4 participants), some (n = 5–8
participants), many (n = 9–12 participants), and most
(n ≥ 13 participants) are used.
Participants’ perceptions of policy ambiguity and conflict
To assess ambiguity and conflict levels of the policy’s
goals and means in the three countries, participants’
opinions on the extent of clarity of the country’s PV pol-
icy and its means of implementation were sought. Re-
garding conflict, participants’ views on whether they
agreed with the policy’s goals and its method of imple-
mentation were solicited. Figure 1 reflects the position
of each country on the ambiguity-conflict matrix based
on participants’ perceptions of their country’s policy
ambiguity and conflict.
Perceptions concerning policy ambiguity
Overall, participants’ responses pointed to low levels of
perceived policy ambiguity in Jordan and Oman. Na-
tional pharmacovigilance centre members in the two
countries unanimously described their policies’ goals
and means as clear. Many industry participants in Jordan
agreed with this view, however, Oman’s industry partici-
pants had mixed views with some believing that the
policy was ambiguous.
“It’s [the policy] clear, it’s easy to understand, and if
you have any questions, you can find it.“ (Participant
2, JFDA, Jordan).
“They [the national centre] still have to clearly de-
fine what they actually want from others and what
they are actually going to implement… little more
clear statements and definitions should be given
from the Ministry, the authority who’s
Table 3 Key questions asked in interview topic guide
• What difficulties did you face in the implementation of your country’s
pharmacovigilance policy?
• What issues assisted in the implementation of your country’s
pharmacovigilance policy?
• How clear do you feel are your country’s pharmacovigilance policy
goals?
• How clear is your country’s pharmacovigilance policy in describing
how it is to be implemented?
• Is there any aspect of your country’s pharmacovigilance policy that
you don’t agree with?
Fig. 1 Study countries’ position on the ambiguity-conflict matrix based on perceptions of policy ambiguity and conflict. Adapted from
Matland [28].
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implementing.“ (Participant 4, pharmaceutical in-
dustry, Oman).
Participants’ responses in Kuwait indicated that per-
ceived policy ambiguity levels were high overall. While
members of the national centre all agreed that the pol-
icy’s goals and means were clear, many industry partici-
pants had the opposite view.
“…when it comes to implementing the [pharmacov-
igilance] system, still there is no clear guidance or
clear regulation regarding this…” (Participant 18,
pharmaceutical industry, Kuwait).
Perceptions concerning policy conflict
Participants’ responses pointed to policy conflict levels
being low overall in the three study countries. National
pharmacovigilance centre participants in each country
were all in agreement with their policies’ goals and
means. Furthermore, many industry participants in
Jordan and Oman, as well as most in Kuwait indicated
the absence of policy conflict.
“I agree [with the pharmacovigilance policy] because
I’m able to perform the tasks that are requested.“
(Participant 8, pharmaceutical industry, Jordan).
“I agree with the goals of the policy. I have no objec-
tion towards them. The policy is simple.“ (Partici-
pant 1, DGPA&DC, Oman).
Factors impacting policy ambiguity and conflict
The themes extracted from the interviews are presented
whilst identifying which group and which country they
came from to allow for the comparison of the similar-
ities and differences between them. Emerging themes
were mapped onto Matland’s [28] model to identify the
process and factors associated with successful pharma-
covigilance policy implementation in the study
countries.
The main themes extracted from the interviews were:
political support, stakeholder involvement, training, pol-
icy characteristics, implementation planning, and
pharmaceutical company-related factors. In what fol-
lows, the impact of the underlying factors pertaining to
each theme will be first discussed as related to policy
ambiguity followed by its impact on policy conflict.
Table 4 summarises the results for the three study
countries.
Political support
Participants from the national and regional centres in
Jordan all agreed that decision-maker (political) support
was a contributing factor to reducing policy ambiguity.
This view was also held by a few members of the
pharmaceutical industry in Jordan and Oman. Partici-
pants outlined how decision-makers engaged and com-
municated with policy implementors throughout the
entire implementation process to minimise policy ambi-
guity by ensuring that there was an understanding of
how it was to be carried out. Participants also identified
decision-makers’ role in providing implementors with
continuous support and encouragement which made
them feel valued and increased confidence levels which
helped in increasing the efficiency of the implementation
process.
“I feel that the administration was constantly sup-
porting us. …I never got the impression that what we
[members of the National Pharmacovigilance
Centre] were doing was underestimated, and they
[the administration] would discuss things with us
such as why certain things were done. There was an
understanding.” (Participant 1, JFDA, Jordan).
In contrast, in Kuwait, a few national centre partici-
pants and some from the industry pointed to decision-
makers’ (both within the Ministry of Health (MOH) and
KDFCA) lack of encouragement or support as a barrier
contributing to increased ambiguity. Moreover, pharma-
covigilance policy implementation was reported by a few
national centre and industry participants as the result of
Table. 4 Factors impacting policy ambiguity and conflict
Ambiguity Conflict
Jordan Oman Kuwait Jordan Oman Kuwait
Political support Decrease Decrease Increase Decrease Decrease Increase
Stakeholder involvement Decrease Decrease Increase Decrease Decrease Increase
Training Decrease Decrease Increase N/A N/A N/A
Policy characteristics Decrease Decrease Increase Decrease Decrease Decrease
Implementation planning Decrease Decrease Decrease Decrease Mix Mix
Company-related factors Decrease Decrease Decrease Increase Increase Increase
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the personal endeavours of some of the staff at KDFCA.
This lack of support resulted from what a few partici-
pants representing both sectors believed to be a lack of
awareness of the subject of pharmacovigilance and thus
the minimisation of its importance.
“People think it’s not a serious thing. I’m not sup-
posed to mention names or something, [but] there
are people in charge who think what we do is very
simple.” (Participant 1, KDFCA, Kuwait).
Political (managerial) support was cited by a few par-
ticipants from Jordan’s national and regional centres, as
well as a few pharmaceutical industry participants from
Jordan and Oman as a facilitator as it reduced the con-
flict in policy implementation means. This was evident
in providing the national centre with official recognition,
independence within the national drug authority’s or-
ganisational structure, and binding the policy to the law
(in Jordan). This provided the national centre with the
necessary legitimacy, importance, and authority to be
able to carry out the implementation process. This fur-
ther expedited obtaining approvals for conducting activ-
ities including training workshops, awareness campaigns,
and conferences.
“In terms of [facilitators] within the Directorate,
there is the support of the administration… The sup-
port of the administration is demonstrated in the
way they provide us with resources, or how they help
in developing our skills, the planning, how they send
us to courses or workshops related to pharmacovigi-
lance. Another example is the director, who tries to
teach us new things, keeping us updated with the
latest information… So, there is communication.“
(Participant 10, DGPA&DC, Oman).
In Kuwait, MOH decision-makers’ lack of political will
towards issues related to pharmacovigilance acted as a
barrier to policy implementation according to a few par-
ticipants from the national centre and some from the
pharmaceutical industry. Participants believed that this
stemmed from decision-makers’ resistance to (or fear of)
change. Examples of this included the lack of official rec-
ognition of the national pharmacovigilance centre or the
lack of a statutory provision for pharmacovigilance. This
pointed to the presence of some conflict between imple-
mentors and decision-makers surrounding the policy
means. The belief among these participants was that this
was in part due to these decision-makers’ lack of under-
standing of pharmacovigilance’s importance.
“The barriers of the implementation…the key
personnel, the key personnel don’t know anything
about pharmacovigilance. So that’s why I’m assum-
ing that they will not implement such or they will
not recognise such a guideline or such a mandate be-
cause of the knowledge, their knowledge. They don’t
know what pharmacovigilance is.“ (Participant 18,
pharmaceutical industry, Kuwait).
Stakeholder involvement
Many participants from Jordan’s pharmaceutical indus-
try and a few from Oman’s described the collaboration
between the national centre and other stakeholders dur-
ing the policy development process as a facilitator. Par-
ticipants described the examples of the pharmaceutical
industry in Jordan and Oman being allowed to review
and provide feedback on the policy during the drafting
process, or other key stakeholders, such as the University
of Jordan, or other departments in Oman's DGPA&DC
being involved in the policy’s development. This partici-
pation had an important role in facilitating implementa-
tion through defining clear policy goals and thus
reducing policy ambiguity and increasing consistency in
implementation among the various stakeholders.
“In the beginning, the JFDA prepared a draft guide-
line, and several companies received a copy of the
draft guideline and they asked us to give our opinion
and if we had any comments, which we did, and
they took some comments into consideration until
the final guideline was published.“ (Participant 14,
pharmaceutical industry, Jordan).
Most participants in Kuwait (representing both sec-
tors) were either unaware of or revealed that the
pharmaceutical industry did not play a role in the policy
development process. Participants described how the
policy was issued as a memo from KDFCA without any
prior involvement from the industry, with a few national
centre participants revealing that the industry’s feedback
was only obtained after the policy had been issued. This
acted as a barrier because it led to some implementors
from the pharmaceutical industry viewing the policy as
ambiguous due to their lack of understanding of how
the policy was to be implemented (i.e., policy means).
“[A barrier to policy implementation was] The com-
panies not understanding the guidelines clearly.“
(Participant 21, pharmaceutical industry, Kuwait).
A few participants from each of Jordan’s national
centre and the pharmaceutical industry also outlined the
importance of collaboration between both sides in the
competency building of the country’s healthcare profes-
sionals in developing a robust pharmacovigilance system.
This helped increase awareness levels and led to a
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reduction in policy ambiguity as illustrated by partici-
pants’ observations of increasing yearly ADR reporting
rates.
“So, it was not only the Health Authority wanting to
implement the guideline. It was done hand in hand
with the marketing authorisation holders, appli-
cants, experts, and expert working groups. There
were effective communication channels, effective
competency building, and all groups working hand
in hand. This was the major contributor to success-
ful implementation.“ (Participant 5, pharmaceutical
industry, Jordan).
Some participants from Jordan, many from Kuwait (al-
most equally represented by both sectors in the two
countries), and a few from Oman (the majority from the
pharmaceutical industry) shared the belief that, despite
their efforts, healthcare professionals’, the public’s, and
pharmaceutical company managers’ lack of knowledge,
awareness, and/or understanding of the pharmacovigi-
lance policy remained a major obstacle to implementa-
tion. They believed that these issues stemmed from
these stakeholders’ perceived ambiguity regarding the
goals and/or the means of implementing the policy. As
such, both the national centre and the industry still
struggled with ADR under-reporting.
“… they [healthcare professionals] don’t know how to
report or they don’t know the importance of report-
ing. They’re saying they don’t know where to report,
how to report, what they have to do if this is the
case…” (Participant 7, pharmaceutical industry, Kuwait).
Like policy ambiguity, many industry participants from
Jordan and a few from Oman indicated the importance
of stakeholder involvement in the policy development
process as a facilitator for its implementation by redu-
cing policy conflict. Stakeholder involvement meant that
agreement could be reached between all parties concern-
ing its goals and means, which contributed to a
reduction in resistance and subsequent delays in
implementation.
“…we [members of the national pharmacovigilance
centre] discussed the subject [the pharmacovigilance
policy] with the marketing authorisation [holders]
and the pharmaceutical companies [and] it was well
accepted. And because whatever we mentioned in
our guideline, it was discussed with them and agreed
with them.“ (Participant 7, DGPA&DC, Oman).
In terms of policy conflict, a lack of stakeholder in-
volvement was an obstacle to implementation. A few
participants from the national centre in each of the three
countries and from the Jordanian regional centres as
well as some industry participants in both Jordan and
Kuwait shared how this lack of involvement was con-
nected to healthcare professionals’ negative attitudes (or
resistance) towards implementing the policy. Similarly, a
few national centre participants in Oman and Kuwait
and a few pharmaceutical industry participants in all
three countries believed this negative attitude also
existed among pharmaceutical company managers. In
these cases, the policy was not viewed as a priority, but
instead as an added burden that these stakeholder
groups were forced to take upon themselves (i.e., conflict
on policy goals and means). This lack of involvement
was viewed as a contributing factor to the under-
reporting of ADRs in the three countries.
“Maybe [one of] the barriers, [is] the company.
Maybe in the beginning they were not very aware of
the importance of pharmacovigilance in the compan-
ies. Because it’s not stopping registration or market-
ing of any product. So, for the companies, it was not
a priority to have a pharmacovigilance team in their
companies.“ (Participant 8, pharmaceutical industry,
Jordan).
Training
Some industry participants in Jordan and a few in Oman
cited the training provided by members of the national
centre in these countries to the industry as a facilitating
factor, which made expectations clear and thus reduced
policy ambiguity. This training was also recognised as
helping to increase pharmacovigilance awareness, which
in turn helped policy implementors develop a better un-
derstanding of the policy’s goals and its means of
implementation.
“…the authority had several workshops teaching the
companies how to prepare a PSMF [pharmacovigi-
lance system master file], a PSUR [periodic safety
update report]. I think that also they had several
workshops for healthcare professionals about phar-
macovigilance, its importance, how to implement it,
they tried to help people to some extent.“ (Participant
14, pharmaceutical industry, Jordan).
Unlike in Jordan and Oman, a few industry partici-
pants in Kuwait indicated that implementors from the
pharmaceutical industry did not receive training regarding
the policy. This led to a lack of knowledge which acted as
a barrier and resulted in an implementation delay.
“We need to know from where to start, for example,
where does the reporting cycle start? We see all this
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on paper, but we haven’t yet actually implemented
this into practice, nor do we know how to implement
it. When they [the authority] issue guidelines they
should be cooperative with us so that we can under-
stand and implement.“ (Participant 5, pharmaceut-
ical industry, Kuwait).
A perceived implementation barrier cited by a few na-
tional centre participants in Jordan and Oman was the
lack of experience in pharmacovigilance of many of the
centres’ employees. This resulted in perceived policy am-
biguity among some implementors who considered it to
be the duty of members of the national centre to explain
and provide training on policy implementation.
“… as a department it’s only been working since
2014 so we’re not talking about a long time. So, most
of us [national pharmacovigilance centre staff] do
not have that much experience. So, the low experi-
ence may be a reason [for difficulties in implementa-
tion]” (Participant 2, JFDA, Jordan).
Interestingly, none of the participants cited training as
a factor impacting policy conflict.
Policy characteristics
Participants in all three countries pointed to the nature
of the policy itself as a facilitating factor for policy im-
plementation. A few members each from the national
centre and the pharmaceutical industry in Jordan and
Oman pointed out that the policy was written in a man-
ner that made it easier for implementors to understand
its purpose and means of implementation. It was also
emphasised that the level of detail present within the
policy helped reduce ambiguity. The Jordanian JFDA’s
creation of checklists to accompany the policy simplified
implementation, and in Oman, this was achieved
through the creation of a national abridged version of
the original Arab GVP guideline.
“…when we [members of the national pharmacovigi-
lance centre] developed our own summarised guide-
lines, this process [implementation] became easier;
we were able to communicate properly with the com-
panies. We were able to understand the companies
and they were able to understand us.“ (Participant 1,
DGPA&DC, Oman).
“It [the policy] is a simplified version of the Arab
GVP guidelines. The companies have informed [us]
that it is quite to the point and simple.“ (Participant
14, pharmaceutical industry, Oman).
Some industry participants from Kuwait noted a lack
of clarity and detail (i.e., policy ambiguity) on how to im-
plement the policy (e.g., if medication errors were to be
reported) and that there was inconsistency in the infor-
mation being provided to them (e.g., submission of Peri-
odic Safety Update Reports (PSUR)/Periodic Benefit-Risk
Evaluation Reports (PBRER) for generic products). This
led to companies implementing the policy individually
based on their own beliefs on what was required, leading
to variations between them.
”…. the guidelines are not very clear for Kuwait, it’s
like all over.” (Participant 10, pharmaceutical indus-
try, Kuwait).
“Sometimes I get a question about the PSURs for ge-
nerics. In the EU [European Union], we don’t have
to submit PSURs for generics, but in the Arab guide-
line it is mandatory. So, who should we follow?”
(Participant 21, pharmaceutical industry, Kuwait).
As was the case with policy ambiguity, participants
noted that the nature of the policy also impacted policy
conflict. A few participants each from the national
centre and the industry in Jordan and Oman as well as
many industry participants in Kuwait stressed the im-
portance of the policy’s compliance with both the Arab
GVP guideline (and the European GVP guidelines from
which it derived), as an important facilitator.
This meant that the goals of the policy were aligned
with those of regional and international guidance, which
were centred on drug safety and hence decreased the
likelihood of conflict occurring due to stakeholders’ dif-
fering views.
“I agree with them [the policy goals], yes, because ac-
tually, these are international guidelines. We are not
drafting something new. It is all adopted from inter-
national guidelines. There are of course certain
things that might be customised according to the
country, and I agree with them.“ (Participant 10,
pharmaceutical industry, Jordan).
A few of the national centre participants in Jordan and
a few participants each from the national centre and the
industry in Oman described how the tailoring of the na-
tional policy according to the country’s capabilities also
acted as a facilitator for policy implementation by redu-
cing policy conflict around its means of implementation.
Participants elaborated that this was done through in-
corporating only those aspects of the Arab GVP guide-
line whose implementation was deemed achievable
(when considering the local conditions) into the national
Garashi et al. Globalization and Health           (2021) 17:97 Page 9 of 15
policy. A few participants from the national centre and
some from the industry in Kuwait also cited this factor
as acting as a facilitator in reducing conflict associated
with policy implementation.
“I have seen countries who have implemented very
vast guidelines, but they don’t know what is in it. So,
some countries are… I mean their structure is not
capable of implementing those guidelines which
already stated to be in place. Whereas in Oman it is
not the case, their team have studied [the Arab GVP
guidelines] and they have taken only the things that
they can implement in this stage.“ (Participant 9,
pharmaceutical industry, Oman).
Implementation planning
Only participants from Jordan (a few each from the na-
tional centre and the industry) indicated that decision-
makers in the country set up a formal working commit-
tee that was tasked with developing the operational as-
pects of the pharmacovigilance system. Therefore, an
implementation plan was laid out whereby it was made
clear to implementors how, when, and what aspects of
the policy were to be implemented at a particular point
in time, and that this facilitated implementation by redu-
cing ambiguity. Although participants in Oman did not
indicate the establishment of a formal working commit-
tee, a few participants from the national centre and the
industry pointed out that there was a constant line of
dialogue between the industry and the national centre
during the different stages of the implementation process.
“They [the national pharmacovigilance centre] first
of all they started by insisting that you had to have
as a company a pharmacovigilance department, not
a department as such, but activities, and then you
had to have a master file, and then, later on, they
said that you should have a resident Omani
pharmacist as a local safety person in Oman…”
(Participant 3, pharmaceutical industry, Oman).
Another facilitator described by a few participants
from the national centre and many from the industry in
Jordan was the national centre carrying out pharmacov-
igilance inspections, both during the initial stages of the
policy implementation and once the policy was fully im-
plemented. This reduced policy ambiguity among indus-
try implementors since it allowed the national centre to
not only monitor but also assist with policy
implementation.
“In Jordan, they were able to accompany most of the
companies and to provide them with guidance. For a
while, maybe a year or two, even when they would
say they were coming for an inspection; it was not so
much an inspection as it was an assessment of the
situation while providing guidance or recommenda-
tions…” (Participant 14, pharmaceutical industry,
Jordan).
In contrast, participants from Kuwait agreed that an
implementation plan was lacking for the KDFCA, which
acted as an implementation barrier by causing ambiguity
to companies in terms of how the policy was to be
implemented.
“No [there were no steps taken from the authority
with regards to the implementation of the policy],
they just issue the policy, and they say, effective so
and so date and we have to adhere to that.“ (Partici-
pant 10, pharmaceutical industry, Kuwait).
According to a few participants from both sectors in
Jordan, a gradual implementation of the policy which in-
volved not mandating policy implementation on all com-
panies (particularly those with little experience in
pharmacovigilance) from the outset facilitated imple-
mentation. It was explained that a stepwise approach,
whereby aspects of the policy which were more achiev-
able (e.g., developing a PSMF and ADR reporting forms)
were focused on in the beginning, gradually moving onto
more complex aspects (e.g., preparing PSUR/PBRER).
This resulted in a smoother implementation process due
to reduced conflict between stakeholders around the
policy means.
“…they [the national pharmacovigilance centre] were
not tough from the beginning in that they published
the guideline today and then required that they be
implemented within the next month; they gave the
companies sufficient time to have a PSMF, to know
how to fill out the form, to adapt the timelines, all of
these things.“ (Participant 14, pharmaceutical indus-
try, Jordan).
A few participants from Kuwait’s pharmaceutical in-
dustry viewed the national drug authority’s failure to
provide them with an adaptation period before imple-
mentation, and the lack of an adequate timeframe for
proper implementation, as barriers and a source of pol-
icy conflict. This contrasted with the situation in Jordan
and Oman where participants from both sectors indi-
cated that companies were afforded an adjustment
period and a timeframe for policy implementation, thus
avoiding policy conflict.
“In general, in Kuwait, the barriers would be that
they impose things without giving a grace period. In
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other countries, when a new guideline is issued, they
inform you that implementation will start from a
certain date. They give you a grace period to prepare
yourself.“ (Participant 5, pharmaceutical industry,
Kuwait).
Despite indicating the presence of an implementation
plan, a few participants from Jordan’s national centre, as
well as a few from the industry, identified the absence of
adequate funding as a barrier. Stakeholder views sur-
rounding policy means were thus incompatible and re-
sulted in policy conflict, which in turn hampered efforts
in building awareness and conducting training work-
shops for stakeholders. In contrast, most participants
from Oman and Kuwait did not highlight funding as a
factor, indicating the absence of policy conflict.
“At the end of the day you are in the governmental
sector, and in this country, we don’t have resources
allocated for pharmacovigilance to promote aware-
ness or other things that we need. We found solu-
tions by forming collaborations with stakeholders,
drug manufacturers and drug agents (distributors)
to do such events in Jordan.“ (Participant 7, JFDA,
Jordan).
Company-related factors
A few participants from the pharmaceutical industry in
all three countries and a few from the national centre in
Oman believed that being a multinational company with
experience operating in developed countries, where
pharmacovigilance policies and regulations were more
stringent acted, as a facilitator. Similarly, a few Jordanian
and Kuwaiti industry participants thought that local
companies which had licensing agreements with multi-
national companies facilitated policy implementation
due to clauses in their agreements that required stan-
dards to be in place on par with those of the multina-
tionals. This meant that there was less ambiguity due to
the presence of a degree of familiarity with the guidance
and hence policy implementation proceeded more
smoothly.
“…most of the points that are in the [Arab GVP]
guidelines it is already implemented by the multi-
national companies because it is part of the
European guideline, so it was easy to implement by
these pharmaceutical companies.“ (Participant 7,
DGPA&DC, Oman).
A few of Jordan’s and Oman’s pharmaceutical industry
participants pointed to the lack of harmonisation among
Arab countries in implementing the Arab GVP guideline
as part of their national policies. Each country in the
region appeared to have its own set of rules and guide-
lines extracted from the same source, which confused
companies operating in multiple countries in the region.
This represented a source of conflict between the com-
panies and the national pharmacovigilance centres.
“Sometimes external regulatory authorities having
different requests acts as a barrier. There is a unified
guideline, but no unified actions. So, we have the
same guideline, but different requests, regulations in
each country.“ (Participant 15, pharmaceutical in-
dustry, Jordan).
Discussion
This is the first study to employ Matland’s [28]
ambiguity-conflict model of policy implementation to
analyse and identify the type of pharmacovigilance policy
implementation process in three Arab countries with
differing levels of system performance (Jordan, Oman,
and Kuwait). This in turn is used to inform recommen-
dations for the implementation of a pharmacovigilance
policy (incorporating the Arab GVP guideline) in coun-
tries with pharmacovigilance systems at a nascent stage
of development (such as Kuwait). The qualitative ap-
proach based on interviews allowed for gaining a deep
understanding of the mechanisms as well as the facilita-
tors and barriers to pharmacovigilance policy implemen-
tation in Arab countries. Application of the two
dimensions of Matland’s model (i.e., the levels of policy
ambiguity and policy conflict in its development and
implementation) provided a novel yet manageable
approach to identifying the process and factors
associated with successful pharmacovigilance policy
implementation.
This study suggests that the elements underlying suc-
cessful policy implementation in Jordan and Oman were
rooted in their respective approaches and include man-
agement support, policy characteristics (including realis-
tic policy objectives as well as clarity of policy goals and
means) stakeholder involvement, training, and imple-
mentation planning. In contrast, these elements were ei-
ther absent or not properly considered in Kuwait. These
could be the underlying reasons for its lagging pharma-
covigilance system in comparison with other Arab coun-
tries. In what follows, each of these elements will be
discussed in the context of Matland’s [28] model and
other existing literature on policy implementation.
Effective management support has been demonstrated
to motivate implementors to carry out their functions,
whereas a lack of engagement by senior officials causes
implementors to feel isolated and insecure. [39] Add-
itionally, management support aids in the elimination of
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structural obstacles conflicting with successful policy
implementation such as resource shortages. [40] In
Matland’s [28] model, these two aspects of management
support are related to both reducing policy ambiguity
and conflict. In Jordan and Oman, decision-makers pro-
vided support throughout the entire process by initiating
and guiding the policy’s implementation. These actions
reduced policy ambiguity and conflict by ensuring clarity
and agreement regarding policy goals and means of
achievement respectively. In contrast, management sup-
port was missing from Kuwait’s pharmacovigilance pol-
icy process thus acting as an impediment that caused
policy ambiguity to implementors regarding their roles.
This needs to change to motivate implementors to
follow through with implementation.
Governments of developing countries often devise pol-
icies with ambitious goals without considering the prac-
ticality of implementing them given the local contextual
factors. This results in an implementation gap with
many policy goals left unfulfilled. [41] This issue relates
to policy conflict within Matland’s [28] model which
arises due to differences in stakeholder’s views regarding
how the policy goals are to be met.
The Arab GVP guideline was designed as a model of
best practice to be followed by countries in the region.
However, it is flexible in allowing the individual coun-
tries to implement the parts that suit them at the time
and based on the available resources and capacities. [23]
Jordan and Oman’s policies benefitted from this flexibil-
ity by focusing on aspects that could be practically im-
plemented given their respective capacities thus allowing
for a smoother implementation process. This approach
was also followed, though to a lesser extent, in Kuwait.
Therefore, it should be given greater consideration by its
decision-makers when implementing future iterations of
the policy.
Studies have shown that policy clarity is a significant
factor affecting policy implementation. [35, 37, 42, 43]
This is consistent with Matland’s [28] model which re-
lates policy ambiguity to the clarity of its goals and the
impact of local conditions on implementation. A distinct
feature of Jordan and Oman’s policies was their simpli-
city and attention to detail leading to low ambiguity thus
making it easy for implementors to understand what was
required of them. Kuwait’s policy was not sufficiently
clear in delineating the roles and responsibilities of each
side, which is consistent with high ambiguity in Mat-
land’s [28] model. This resulted in differences in imple-
mentation among companies. Policymakers in other
Arab countries with nascent systems would be wise
to learn from these experiences by developing a
policy that clearly outlines the roles and responsi-
bilities of all parties involved in the implementation
process.
Stakeholder involvement in the policy development
and implementation process has been identified as an
important means of ensuring a sense of ownership of
the policy. [44, 45] In Jordan and Oman, the active in-
volvement of members of the national centre and the
pharmaceutical industry in developing and implement-
ing the pharmacovigilance policy contributed to a better
understanding of its practical implementation (i.e., low
ambiguity). Moreover, agreement of both sides meant
less opposition (i.e., low conflict) during policy imple-
mentation. However, in Kuwait, pharmaceutical com-
panies were not involved at any stage of the policy
process. Consequently, pharmaceutical companies did
not fully understand their responsibilities regarding the
pharmacovigilance policy’s implementation and thus
viewed it as highly ambiguous.
Given the important role human resources play in the
policy implementation process, ensuring proper training
and orientation regarding the policy becomes a priority.
[45] Properly trained policy implementors possess
greater competency and self-belief to overcome obstacles
that they may face. [43, 46, 47] In Jordan and Oman,
policy implementors from both sectors underwent train-
ing thus facilitating implementation by ensuring that all
involved parties understood their roles and responsibil-
ities (i.e., low ambiguity). In Kuwait, however, the ab-
sence of training related to the policy meant that
implementors (particularly from the industry) lacked
knowledge regarding the policy (i.e., high ambiguity).
Decision-makers in Kuwait, as well as in other counties
with nascent systems, should adopt training programmes
in the future when implementing policies, especially
complex policies which encompass a large group of
people.
The presence of a strategic plan for the implementa-
tion process, which includes priorities, goals, and time-
lines, is an important prerequisite for successful policy
implementation. [48] Furthermore, for a policy to be
fully implemented, sufficient time is required, which is
often underestimated by policymakers. [49] The highest
level of policy implementation planning was observed in
Jordan, while at the other end of the spectrum was
Kuwait, where setting an implementation plan seemed
to be neglected. Moreover, it was observed that Jordan
and Oman’s pharmaceutical companies were provided
appropriate implementation timeframes, which de-
creased policy conflict thus facilitating proper policy im-
plementation. The lack of a comparable implementation
timetable in Kuwait meant that implementation in some
companies was delayed.
In implementing health-related policies, the WHO
recommends proceeding in a stepwise manner starting
with the easier aspects of the policy to ensure high visi-
bility, success, and support during the initial stages. [50]
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Policy implementation planning in Oman and Jordan
embodied a stepwise approach in implementation
whereby the policy’s simpler aspects were required to be
implemented first and the more complex aspects imple-
mented gradually thereafter. This resulted in lower pol-
icy ambiguity and conflict. This was absent in Kuwait as
all aspects of the policy were implemented in a single
phase resulting in confusion (i.e., high ambiguity) and
subsequent delays in some companies’ implementation.
This evidence suggests that a stepwise approach be
taken into consideration by other countries with nascent
systems in their implementation planning of a pharma-
covigilance policy.
Jordan’s pharmacovigilance policy allowed for moni-
toring, evaluating, and enforcing policy implementation
by conducting inspections of companies’ pharmacovigi-
lance systems and processes. This served as a tool for
the national centre to positively educate pharmaceutical
companies on the proper implementation of the policy.
Whilst Oman’s policy did contain provisions that would
allow pharmacovigilance inspections to be undertaken in
the future, this tool was not available in Kuwait. There-
fore, these countries’ national centres were not able to
evaluate companies’ implementation of the policy and
take corrective actions as required. The presence of such
a mechanism permits continuous progress assessment,
provides transparency as well as accountability and
serves as a means of comparison across locations and
time. [50] Moreover, it serves as a means of obtaining
feedback on policy implementation progress, which per-
mits policymakers to make the necessary adjustments as
needed. [26] This points to policy implementation plan-
ning having a role in the reduction of policy ambiguity
and conflict.
Applying Matland’s [28] model to the factors impact-
ing the pharmacovigilance implementation process in
conjunction with participants’ views on its ambiguity
and conflict enabled the discernment of policy ambiguity
and conflict levels within the three countries, and the
type of implementation strategy being followed. The
presence of both low policy ambiguity and conflict in
Jordan and Oman points to the presence of a structured
approach to policy development and implementation.
This suggests that the implementation process’ charac-
teristics in these countries were consistent with what
Matland [28] describes as “administrative implementa-
tion”. Given that the implementors were clear about and
supportive of the goals of the policy in this type of im-
plementation, the primary strategy becomes ensuring
that adequate resources are provided by those at the top.
[28] In Kuwait however, while participants’ views and
the cited factors impacting policy point to high ambigu-
ity, there were differences in terms of policy conflict. On
the one hand, participants’ views surrounding policy
conflict pointed to low conflict, while on the other hand,
the cited factors’ impact pointed to an increase in con-
flict. This suggests policy implementation falling in be-
tween the “experimental implementation” and “symbolic
implementation” processes. In both cases, success is
variable across locations and is dependent on contextual
factors such as the actors involved and resource avail-
ability. However, in the former, the process’ focus is on
learning about policy impacts. [28] While in the latter,
successful outcomes are often “determined by the coali-
tion of actors at the local level who control the available
resources” (28, p. 168). Both mechanisms are consistent
with the differences in policy implementation by com-
panies in Kuwait due to it occurring based on each com-
panies’ understanding. Therefore, it is recommended
that policymakers follow a more structured process in
developing and implementing pharmacovigilance policy
to reduce ambiguity and conflict, thus moving in the
direction of “administrative implementation”.
This study has a few limitations. First, there was po-
tential for response bias to occur due to interviewees’
hesitation of criticising decision-makers, which was miti-
gated by assuring participants of their anonymity and
the confidentiality of their views. Second, participants’
responses could have been exaggerated or contain inac-
curacies because they were reliant on memory. This was
minimised by confirming information from more than
one participant, comparison with information from the
literature and correspondence with the participants for
clarification purposes. Finally, the views of healthcare
professionals or patients were not explored.
A major strength of the study lies in its use of a theor-
etical framework adapted from policy implementation
research to guide the study. The study’s use of a qualita-
tive approach is also a strength as it provided detailed
information on the policy implementation process in the
three study countries which allowed for comparison be-
tween them. Finally, the inclusion of members of the
pharmaceutical industry provided an additional perspec-
tive on the issues concerning pharmacovigilance policy
implementation.
Conclusions
Threats posed by ADRs necessitate the implementation
of policies aimed at safeguarding public health. Based on
the study findings, several recommendations are put for-
ward to reduce policy ambiguity and conflict and facili-
tate an orderly implementation process:
 Strengthening decision-makers’ relationships with
implementors through continuous engagement and
communication to provide guidance and motivation.
 Ensure that all relevant stakeholders (including
health authority, industry, and healthcare
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professionals) are involved in the policy
development and implementation processes whereby
their feedback is taken into consideration.
 Carry out awareness campaigns and training
workshops targeted at all relevant stakeholders to
increase knowledge and understanding regarding the
policy’s goals and means of implementation.
 Develop a tailored pharmacovigilance policy that is
in line with available capacities and capabilities.
 Ensure that the policy clearly outlines the roles and
responsibilities of all stakeholders involved in the
implementation process and binding it into law.
 Planning should be carried out prior to policy
implementation whereby the process’ needs in terms
of time and resources are assessed, objectives and
milestones with suitable timeframes are outlined,
and suitable adjustment periods are provided.
 Ensure that policy implementation follows a
stepwise approach that is gradual whereby, as time
passes, the aspects of the policy that are
implemented increase in their level of complexity.
 Have in place a process for monitoring and
evaluating policy implementation consistency,
accuracy, and compliance which is non-punitive.
The lessons learned from studying the three countries
can help guide both the development and implementa-
tion of pharmacovigilance policy in other countries with
nascent pharmacovigilance systems and move countries
in the region closer towards their shared goal of har-
monisation based on the Arab GVP guideline. Future re-
search could focus on the views of other stakeholder
groups including healthcare professionals, academics,
and patients regarding the pharmacovigilance policy and
its implementation.
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